A core claim about agricultural policy making is that it is 'compartmentalized' and 'exceptional'. In this picture, the policy process is insulated from other policy concerns, has a distinctive system of actors and institutional structures, and rooted in extensive governmental intervention in the market and the re-distribution of resources from taxpayers to food producers.
Introduction
A central element in the historically dominant picture of agricultural policy is that decision making takes place in a subsystem with a distinctive set of actors and institutional structures that is insulated from other policy concerns (a 'compartmentalised' policy process) and that policy instruments and programmes reflect a particular form of state intervention that differs from rules that generally apply to other major sectors of the economy ('exceptionalism'). The agricultural policy subsystem has been underpinned by ideational congruence, a consensus over values that marginalises some non-farm actors, and which produces policy outcomes that favour privileged interests. In recent years, attention has turned to the possibilities for a 'de-compartmentalised' and 'post-exceptional' agricultural politics (see Daugbjerg and Feindt, Introduction to this issue) . In terms of process, this would mean that policy concerns relating to issues such as the environment and climate change (all 'messy' problems that tend to cut across the traditional boundaries of policy making) have become increasingly important; in relation to instruments and programmes, that the highly interventionist role of government has weakened.
This contribution uses four indicators of change that relate to institutions, actors, ideas and programmes to assess whether the 2013 reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) provide evidence for post-exceptional agricultural politics.
Broadly the contribution considers the impact of inter-institutional policy making and examines the tensions between the persistence of a strong agricultural policy heritage (that strongly emphasises food security and production), and a more open, contested and networked politics that reflects a broader range of issues. It concludes that the reform provides evidence for what may be termed 'shallow' postexceptionalism -some movement from a historically persistent agricultural policy subsystem involving the inclusion of some new actors and some programme change but which leaves the ideational framework largely intact.
Exceptionalism and Post-exceptionalism
Much of the academic literature on agricultural policy has emphasised 'compartmentalization', 'exceptionalism', and the dominance of a 'state-assisted' paradigm (see Coleman et al. 1997; Rieger 2000; Roederer-Rynning 2010; Skogstad 1998 ). Writing on the CAP for example, Grant noted that while the circle of actors involved in the policy process had widened in the early 1990s, agricultural policy remained 'highly compartmentalised', with a 'high political entry barrier into the policy community ' (1997: 148) . In this picture, the institutional configuration -at 4 | P a g e national and EU levels -has been made up of distinctive actors that are contained within relatively impermeable boundaries. The agricultural policy subsystemcentred on food production -is highly insulated from other policy subsystems such as the environment, and the influence of actors who are not central to the core of the subsystem is limited.
'Exceptionalism' highlights a durable interpretive framework, how policy ideas, values and norms are embedded within institutional structures, and shape policy programmes. As defined by Skogstad, it is the 'idea that agriculture is a sector unlike any other economic sector, and, as such, warrants special government support'. This in turn provides the underpinning for the development of the 'state assisted paradigm' with its associated government intervention in relation to regulation and expenditure (1998: 468) . The concept of agricultural exceptionalism therefore 'describes the special treatment of the agricultural sector by governments and international organizations, and the belief system that provides cognitive justification and political legitimation' (Daugbjerg and Feindt, Introduction to this issue: 1).
Bringing compartmentalization and exceptionalism together, Daugbjerg and Feindt note that the agricultural policy subsystem has been characterized 'by a distinct set of sector-oriented institutions and ideas', 'substantial government intervention in the market', and the redistribution of resources to a 'relatively small group of producers and land owners' (Introduction to this issue: 1). A key part of this picture is the emphasis on policy networks, an approach well-suited to established policy subsystems such as agriculture where the status quo is reinforced by ideational 5 | P a g e consensus around the nature of food production (for a summary see Greer 2005: 23-30; Marsh and Smith 2000) . Agriculture policies and associated institutions have been protected by established decision-rules and dominant policy communities. The idea of closed policy communities has been especially prevalent, drawing attention to stable interactions and bargaining over time between state 'agriculture' departments and well-resourced groups representing farmers, based on consensus around values, with largely incremental policy outcomes (Smith 1992) .
What then would 'post-exceptional' agricultural policy look like? In the first instance it would involve the weakening of the historically dominant closed policy communities centred on farmers and the emergence of more 'open' network governance involving a wider range of actors, struggles between competing interests, and corresponding shifts in the nature of policy interventions. There is some evidence for this over the last twenty five years, indicating that policy crisis and exogenous pressures (relating for example to trade liberalisation) can be crucial factors. In the context of BSE and other food crises in the UK for instance, some analysts identified the emergence of an issue network type structure with a wider range of pressure participants in addition to the historically dominant farmers' organizations (see Grant 2004; Jordan et al. 1994; Smith 1991) . Certainly there has been a broadening of the policy agenda, with the inclusion within the agriculture subsystem of issues such as environmental sustainability, rural development and climate change, alongside the traditional focus on food security and production.
However such issues can be absorbed into an agricultural paradigm, as is shown in the creation of the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) 6 | P a g e in the UK (Winter 2003: 51) and there is disagreement over whether the configuration of institutions and actors has been substantially reshaped. So while Woods (2005) referred to the 'collapse' of the agricultural policy community, for others the policy process on the 2001 outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in the UK provided 'little evidence for the emergence of an issue network' and the outcomes 'exhibited a degree of continuity far more consistent with a policy community' centred on the historically powerful farmers' organizations (Wilkinson et al. 2010: 337-8) .
A second element relates to a weakening of the 'state assistance paradigm' and the historically high degree of government intervention in the policy subsystem. In Skogstad's argument paradigm change 'is indicated by deregulation of agricultural markets, the termination or substantial restraint of government expenditures for agriculture, and a discourse antithetical to government intervention ' (1998: 471) .
Here there also is disagreement. For some, cumulative change to the CAPincluding under the MacSharry reforms (1992) and the Fischler package (2003) -represents a decisive ideational shift in policy values and in instruments that has substantially weakened the producer interest, illustrated for example by the move away from direct support for production to decoupled area payments. Burrell (2009) charts a pattern of continuous reform from a highly centralized protectionist policy focused on farm incomes to one that is more market sensitive and environmentally sustainable. For others continuity is emphasized within the framework of the stateassisted paradigm (although it may include the incorporation of new objectives), exemplified in stable budgets and patterns of redistribution, persisting institutional 7 | P a g e settings and path dependence. As Daugbjerg and Feindt note 'we almost face a paradox with much change in policy instruments, ideas and discourses while farm income remains the unaffected "policy core" with relatively stable redistribution of resources into the farm sector' (Introduction to this issue: 4).
Yet policy change should not be viewed as a one-way process. The notion of 'sequencing' shows how changes to the CAP are not necessarily in the same direction and that each reform event opens possibilities for further 'reform' (Daugbjerg 2009) . A reversal to older institutional logics is also possible. While Erjavec et al. (2008) argue that the policy discourse of (Agriculture Commissioners)
Fischler and Fischer-Boel reflected a neo-liberal rhetoric, others claim that the tenure of Cioloş saw a shift back to the state-assisted position in which subsidies are defended as a way to ensure a fair and efficient European agriculture (Rutz et al. 2014 ).
In this context, 'post-exceptionalism' can be used as a diagnostic concept that highlights both continuity and change in the agricultural policy subsystem. For Daugbjerg and Feindt, the value of the concept is that it captures 'the combination of a less compartmentalized policy arena' with ideas that 'retain claims that a policy sector is special, albeit with updated arguments that relate to the problems on the evolving policy agenda (e.g., sustainability, climate change) and which trigger novel policy instruments' (Introduction to this issue: 8). As they summarize, there is 'a set of exceptionalist ideas which legitimize a set of compartmental institutions that provide a dedicated policy space for a policy community to adopt and implement policy instruments and programmes that serve their interests and comply with their 
CAP Reform 2013
There is considerable disagreement about whether agricultural policy reform can be were an important influence on the CAP reform debate. Here there were pressures for a radical reorientation of priorities and for lower spending in the context of austerity, which would inevitably mean a reduction in the agriculture budget (Greer 2013 (Greer , 2012 . Matthews (2015) identifies three linkages between the MFF and CAP negotiations: (1) the reform was shaped 'by the need to create a narrative to legitimise and defend the share of the CAP budget' in the MFF (2015: 169); (2) there was a condensed negotiation window because the key actors delayed finalising their 10 | P a g e positions on CAP reform until the budget proposals were agreed in early 2013; and (3) some aspects of CAP reform -relating to convergence and greening for example -were included in the MFF itself (with a subsequent impact on the decision making process).
In essence, the broad lines of the reform were set out in the MFF, leaving the Agriculture Council to fill in the specific details. While there were disagreements between austerity-minded countries (Germany and the UK wanted a squeeze on the total budget) and those who wanted to keep agricultural spending at the existing level (e.g. France, Italy and Spain), the outcome of the MFF was that as a percentage of the budget, spending on the CAP will decrease slowly to around a third of the total by 2020 (the absolute figures remain relatively stable). As the Commission noted, this showed 'continued strong support for an ambitious agricultural policy' (2013: 3), and it also 'surprised and delighted farm groups' (Matthews 2015: 171) .
Crucially the MFF maintained the 75:25 spending ratio between pillar 1 and pillar 2, which was a setback for countries such as the UK which wanted a reorientation of funds from direct payments to rural development programmes -indeed the negotiations resulted in a reduction on the original plans of around two per cent for pillar 1 but by nearly eight per cent for pillar 2.
Key objectives for the Commission were to combine a 'greener and more equitably distributed' first pillar alongside a second pillar 'more focussed on competitiveness and innovation, climate change and the environment' (2011a: 16). As well as making the CAP more efficient and effective, a core aim was for a fairer distribution of payments -across pillars, between farmers (from larger to smaller enterprises) and 11 | P a g e between 'old' and 'new' member states. To do this, the approach had three main elements -convergence, capping, and greening -and combined compulsory requirements with voluntary options. The extent to which this approach can meet the objectives set is still unclear (especially in relation to redistribution) but what is clear is that the reform has substantially extended the ability of member states to tailor the CAP to their own conditions (e.g. for regionalising the basic payment, continuing 'coupled' support, providing assistance for small farmers, 'capping' and the reduction of payments, and environmental sustainability).
In the distribution of resources, member states can strike different balances between pillar 1 and pillar 2. A hotly disputed element of the reform was the proposal for 'capping' -the introduction of a maximum ceiling on payments -which had been fiercely resisted in previous reform episodes by countries with efficient and large scale enterprises such as the UK and France. The Commission proposed that payment levels should 'progressively converge' and payments to large beneficiaries subject to 'progressive capping' to improve the distribution of payments between farmers (2011b: 3).
Reductions (degressivity) would start at 20 per cent for entitlements between €150,000 and €200,000, gradually increasing in three stages to a 100 per cent 14 | P a g e reduction at a maximum ceiling for payments of €300,000. The final compromise reform allowed substantial flexibility to member states across a range of decisions.
While all are required to reduce payments above €150,000 at a minimum rate of 5 per cent, member states have the choice about whether to cap payments. Fifteen 'countries' (only England in the UK) will apply the minimum reduction, whereas nine will apply a cap at different rates on amounts ranging from €150,000 (including Ireland and Poland) to €600,000 in Scotland. Italy introduced a 50 per cent reduction at €150,000 and 100 per cent at €500,000; Wales opted for the most graduated system, starting at 15 per cent over €150,000, increasing in stages to a 100 per cent reduction at €300,000. It is estimated by the Commission that these decisions will transfer over In other areas, the desire to foster market competitiveness was reflected in the removal of remaining production limits and the introduction of measures to facilitate co-operation between producers. Although market intervention remains as a safety net, and the last remaining export subsidies are reduced to zero, the force of renewed arguments about food security underpinned decisions to retain some production quotas -for sugar until 2017 (two years later than their planned abolition) and a new vine planting scheme after 2016 was introduced.
A 'post-exceptional' CAP?
Four indicators for assessing the extent of movement to a post-exceptional agricultural policy were identified above, so how does the 2013 CAP reform fare in relation to these?
New Institutions and Structures
Compartmentalization gained power, and a quarter said that none of the scenarios described the process particularly well (Swinnen and Knops 2014: 74) .
Overall the evidence indicates that the policy process on CAP reform has been substantially altered in terms of its institutional structures at the EU level, and that new patterns of inter-institutional policy-making have emerged. The question however is whether this has been accompanied by the entry of new actors and ideas in the policy subsystem.
18 | P a g e
New Actors & Interests
Agricultural exceptionalism buttresses the interests of food producers, structured in dominant policy communities. Post-exceptionalism would see the emergence of actor constellations of a more 'issue-network' type that include 'players from a wider range of backgrounds' such as consumer, environmental and animal welfare groups, and slow food activists. However conflict is not inevitable and coalition buildinge.g. between farmers and environmentalists -may form around exceptionalist ideas.
Paradoxically, while this can help to stabilize the ideational framework, it may also indicate a movement towards post-exceptionalism (Daugbjerg and Feindt, Introduction to this issue: 9).
Despite the institutional changes around the CAP it is not clear that the policy subsystem has substantially opened up to a wider range of actors and interests.
Certainly the EP has a greater formal role in CAP decision-making, but the extent to which this indicates a post-exceptional agricultural politics is debatable. Importantly 
New values and ideas
The importance of a changed constellation of actors depends partly on the assumption that this will bring with it new values and policy ideas. As Richardson has noted, new ideas pose a particular threat to established policy communities because they can 'disrupt existing policy systems, power relationships and policies'
(2000: 1017-8). In agricultural policy, this usually has been taken to mean a challenge to the preferences of the established productivist policy community, and to core ideas such as the notion that supporting the farm sector is vital to the broader 20 | P a g e national interest, especially in relation to food security and the role of stable farm incomes in underpinning rural communities (Skogstad 1998: 468) .
In ideational terms, post-exceptionalism might be indicated by greater influence for market liberal ideas, but these may be absorbed and re-interpreted in a way that preserves the notion that the sector is special. While in previous CAP reforms, policy Knops remark for example that most policy ideas within the EP were 'little more than a return to the market regulation instruments of the past', influenced by agricultural exceptionalism and 'justified by arguments relating to food security and 21 | P a g e economic crisis ' (2014: 14 & 95) . As Matthews (2013) further notes, the notion that the EP 'would bring new ideas to the debate and help to widen the range of interests that could influence agricultural policy also proved to be hopelessly naïve'.
Policy change
The fourth indicator for the emergence of post exceptional agricultural policy making relates to policy instruments and programmes. Exceptionalism was characterised by some specific policy mechanisms such as payments for production, tariffs and quotas, and intervention buying to stabilize prices. Certainly there has been a move away from these instruments over the last thirty years, indicated by the removal of many 'trade distorting' market support mechanisms, the introduction of 'decoupled' direct payments, and pillar 2 measures such as agri-environment schemes, often justified using rhetoric about the provision of public goods. In the 2013 CAP reform, the Commission placed particular emphasis on promoting market competitiveness, convergence and capping to promote fairer distribution of resources, and the 'greening' of a substantial element of direct payments. While this may be viewed as consistent with a post-exceptional direction of travel, the retention of some market intervention instruments and the introduction of voluntary coupled support schemes (that have been adopted by over twenty countries), seem to suggest the persistence of older logics around food security. In convergence and capping some countries also have exploited the flexibility allowed to reinforce more traditional exceptionalism. The ideas for 'greening' in particular were the subject of 22 | P a g e much debate and controversy. While environmentalists were sceptical about the impact of the 'limited greening' proposed by the Commission, for farmers the proposals undermined the EU's capacity to meet food security objectives, and some governments including France and Spain argued for a 'flexible' system in which it would be possible to have 'agriculturally sustainable use of areas of ecological interest' (Euractiv.com 2012a) .
The agreed reform markedly watered down the Commission's proposals on greening; indeed some even suggest that the outcome was 'a step backwards for the integration of environmental concerns into the CAP' (Hart 2015: 246) . According to a spokesperson for the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), while the proposals sowed 'some green shoots of hope', these were 'quickly cut down' in the interinstitutional bargaining. By 'trying to exempt as many farmers as possible from the most basic agronomic practices, they diluted the content of the greening measures and added dozens of grounds for exemption to already very weak rules' (Defossez 2014) . There are no EU-wide performance standards, member states have flexibility in implementation, and a range of exceptions relating to water pollution, ecological focus areas, crop diversification and environmental sustainability were introduced.
So although a core principle of the original proposals was that greening should apply to all farms, nearly half of all farmland and 89 per cent of farmers will not be covered by the rules (for a full discussion of the greening outcomes see Hart 2015: 263-9 ).
This 'greenwashing' was largely a result of the inter-institutional bargaining between the EP and Council, although the interplay between them was complex.
Both were concerned about the impact of greening on competitiveness, production and food security, and supported plans to introduce 'greater flexibility', reflecting concerns expressed by farming stakeholder groups about 'being locked into standardised environmental rules despite the diverse landscape of European agriculture' (Spence 2013) . Within COMAGRI, environmental considerations 'were drowned out by concerns about agricultural production effects' and there were few environmental interests in the EU institutions 'that saw much to be gained from a protracted defence of proposals whose environmental delivery looked likely to be disappointing' (Hart 2015: 271-2) . As a spokesperson for BirdLife Europe complained, 'Europe is offered a budget that scales back investment in the environment and caters for the usual fat cats that have been milking the system' (Harrabin 2013) . So while environmental groups helped to fend off some proposalssuch as paying farmers twice for carrying out the same activity in pillar 1 and pillar 2 -their influence overall was weak.
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